Religious Perspectives in American Culture: Volume 2 by Margolin, Ephraim
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
thus not the coup de grace it was intended to be. Mr. Justice Black's activism,
whatever its merits or demerits, cannot be condemned by demonstrating the
weaknesses in Mr. Justice Sutherland's activism. It must be attacked in its
own right.
The choice between activism and restraint is not a choice between good and
evil, or right and wrong. Either may be fatal if taken in large doses to the
exclusion of tempering quantities of the other, and the choice between these
approaches requires a careful eclecticism together with a delicate and thought-
ful balancing of competing interests. Professor Mendelson is apparently con-
tent to define the only acceptable occasions for the exercise of activism as those
occasions in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw fit to employ it. That is rather
shallow analysis, and that is why his book is ultimately so dissatisfying.
Ironically, he has provided the ideal closing sentence for a review of his own
work. Speaking of activist doctrine, he declares: "There is more subtlety, more
depth, and more complexity in our culture than such one-sided polemics dream
of."123 There is, indeed. The "conflict in the Court" is one of great subtlety,
depth, and complexity, and is not adequately to be understood on the basis of
the one-sided polemic that Professor Mendelson has offered us.
DEAN ALFANGE, JR.t
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN CULTURE: Volume 2 of the four
volume RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961. Pp. 427.
Religious Perspectives in American Culture is meant for readers innocent
of sophistication in constitutional processes. It spreads thin ink over education,
theology, politics, sociology, statistics, history, economics, and law and over-
flows into the unrelated topics of religion in the arts: in fiction, novels, poetry,
music and in architecture. The mere range of these topics and the insignificant
portion devoted to legal analysis invite shallowness. But the main fault of this
book is that its shallowness is selective. It passes for an objective, authoritative
study, an oversimplified view of our constitutional history and church-state
relations. The doctrine of Separation of Church and State is thus criticized
without seriously considering either the majority view of the Supreme Court
or the views of some of the more extreme proponents of Separation. In the
end, the reader faces a city of one way streets. Discretion keeps one from ques-
tioning and delicacy prevents him from even guessing the reason for such
editorial policy.
Will Herberg's essay on "Religion and Education in America" argues for
federal aid to parochial schools and advances the proposition that "if the public
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school is to retain the support of the American people... it cannot remain
religionless."I The changing relations between religion and education suggest
that "whereas in the first period of our history education was conceived as
serving the needs of religion, and in the second the two were regarded as
parallel but separate enterprises equally worthy of support, today the original
relation has been reversed."12 Herberg argues that religion is relevant to educa-
tion. He asserts that it is too important to be left to parents and to churches
and, arguing for religion in public education, concludes, in H. L. Mencken's
phrase, that since roses smell good they must make better soup than cabbages.
Herberg does not attempt to offer solutions (the perplexing question of how
religion can be introduced into public schools "is beyond the present context
of discussion"). 3 He suggests merely that "perhaps some combination of
teaching about religion and creating a pro-religious atmosphere in the schools
with coordinated instruction in religion by outside religious bodies will have to
be worked out," but the lines "are by no means clear."4 In addition, we are
cautioned against superficiality of common core approaches and syncretistic
solutions and admonished that the solution must stay within constitutional
bounds.
Herberg agrees that under the Constitution, religion in public schools may
never be "sectarian." But, what is "sectarian"? For some eighteenth century
Protestants "non-sectarian" meant "Protestant" rather than "Methodist,"
"Baptist" or "Presbyterian." This remains sectarian to a Catholic who prefers
"Christian" as a more inclusive concept which, in turn, is markedly sectarian
to Jews. Further dilution of the concept may have curious effects when Flagel-
lant or Dughobor practices are considered, or the term is applied to Agnostics.
This clearly is not Herberg's intent. He simply expands the basis for religious
conformity. His "Three Church America" makes "non-sectarian" sound like
"whatever is accepted by the three main churches in America, the Protestants,
the Catholics and the Jews." Smaller churches are ignored and the broader
the conformity of the numerically strong churches, the greater their isolation.
The real meaning of the first amendment, according to Herberg, is the pro-
hibition of the establishment of one church over the others, of discrimination
among churches and, above all, of going "too far."5 Seemingly, it is not "too
far" for Herberg to describe and sanction a three-church establishment with
built-in discrimination against other minority churches and the secularists. It
is here that Herberg differs from the prevailing view of Mr. Justice Black, that
aid to all churches is as unconstitutional as aid to any one church. Where for
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even if all churches agree on it, for Will Herberg it should be proscribed, if at
all, only because all churches cannot agree on it.
Herberg is probably right in stating that suspicion is one of the chief reasons
for public backing of Separation of Church and State. But he is wrong in urg-
ing it as the sole reason and in disparaging it as a throwback to other eras.
"Perhaps," say the editors in their well-meaning introduction, "the Biblical
faith that 'the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of the Lord
and his Christ' is a fairy-tale fantasy," but "many Christians and Jews(l),
however, have believed it a right reading of historical existence.. ." (emphasis
ours). It may be medieval backivardness to suspect the average teacher in our
schools of conscious prejudice or, indeed, of religious ignorance, but why should
we trust them objectively to teach religion if we cannot rely on the editors of
Religion in American Life?
Herberg challenges the famous dictum in Board of Education v. Minor, that
"united with government religion never rises above merest superstition; united
with religion government never rises above merest despotism.. . ."T This, he
says, audaciously implies that all religions except American Protestantism are
superstitions and all governments but ours are despotisms. However, estab-
lished churches obviously tend to call on state power for help in enforcing their
practices and beliefs. And churches with a political stake in governments con-
tinuously face the dilemma between matters moral and matters politically ex-
pedient. If our freedom as well as our unprecedented acceptance of religion are
due, inter alia, to Separation of Church and State, it would seem that the court
in the Minor case might have erred in overemphasis, but Herberg is guilty of
the worse offense in overlooking the factual forest for semantic trees.
The historical setting for the first amendment occupies much of Herberg's
argument. But in the following essay, Wilber Katz argues, rightly, that his-
torical argument "is highly inconclusive. What the historical studies show
primarily is that in the field of law, as in religion itself, controversy becomes
so charged with emotion that objectivity is difficult to maintain." The argu-
ment that strict Separation should be rejected on the basis of its widespread
violation (e.g. chaplaincy in the armed forces) resembles debunking of speed
limit laws on the ground that ambulances are not covered by it and occasional
speedsters remain unapprehended.
Wilber G. Katz addresses himself to the fluid line of experience corroding
dogmatic doctrines of Separation and Freedom of Worship. "[T]he basic
American principle of church-state relations is neither separation of church
and state nor impartial benevolence towards religion; it is the principle of
religious liberty, which requires strict government neutrality with respect to
6. Introduction to 1 RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE, THE SHAPING OF AumamxeR
RELIGION at 8 (1961).
7. Pp. 25-26, citing 23 Ohio 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233 (1872).
8. P. 57 & n..12. This did not prevent Katz from providing us with an historical analysis
of his own. See also 1 RELIGION IN AMERIcAN LIFE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 322 and 405.
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religion."9 Having said that much, Katz proceeds to support his thesis with
arguments singularly open to the corrosion of experience. His argument is
strongest when opposing the doctrine of Separation of Church and State. In-
deed, a large portion of his essay is devoted to the enumeration of practices
inconsistant with "strict" Separation. His neutralism, however, like that of
most neutralists, simply tends to serve a convenient cloak for secret commit-
ments. Its gist: that the State abstain from activity which will keep religion
out of public schools and aid from parochial institutions. Katz endorses the
since amended Douglas dictum that we are a "religious people." He simply
does not deal with the mutually exclusive situations where freedom to worship
seems to require, but freedom from worship is violated by, given religious
programs in public schools. In justice to Katz, he labors under the disadvan-
tage of writing prior to the Torcaso 10 case, the Sunday Laws" cases, the
Bible Reading 2 and the Prayers in Public Schools 13 cases. This causes an
inescapable fault in footnoting Katz's prejudices. In the end he pummels a dead
horse of absolutism with absolutism of his own.
Finally, Katz notes with disapproval Howe's theory that the doctrine of
Separation is itself a sectarian concept of Protestant origin. "'Those who sup-
port the thesis that each man should be left free by Government to follow the
faith which his mind and heart prefer, very generally, if not invariably, have
in religion, abandoned the belief that an ultimate truth has been revealed for
all and, as truth, is binding on all .... Behind our constitutional provisions
there may lie, therefore, an attitude, if not a religious faith itself, which is pre-
dominantly Protestant in spirit."" 4 This notion is discussed and excitingly
presented in another essay in this volume, William Lee Miller's "American
Religion and American Political Attitudes." Miller points out that the attitude
of voluntarism, anti-authoritarianism, and individual persuasion underlie not
only Separation but all other first amendment areas. There is no doubt that
non-protestant religions of the United States present a challenge to Protes-
tantism and, in turn, are influenced by it. The present day acceptance of political
voluntarism establishes the common denominator of "American" for Protes-
tants, Catholics, Jews, Agnostics, and all the other shades of persuasion. Be-
tween Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'5 establishing the right to maintain parochial
schools, and the line of cases establishing public education without religious
9. P. 54. Katz modestly states that his "comprehensive legal principle" of state neu-
tralism toward religion "may not be the one most widely accepted," which is quite exuber-
antly correct. P. 53.
10. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
11. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
12. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
appeal filed, 30 U.S.L. WErEK 3387 (U.S. May 24, 1962) (No. 997).
13. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14. P. 65. See also 1 RELIGION ix AmmcAN Lirz, op. cit. supra note 6, at 332.
15. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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coercion of any sort, our range of free choice is extended beyond a single, ex-
clusive pattern. American voluntarism, whatever its sources, becomes the back-
ground for commitment.
"How is your wife?" asked a man. "As compared to what?" answered the
other. Compared to the available legal studies, Religious Perspectives in
American Culture is but average, both opinionated and expensive. It is
opinionated-as compared to such studies as Religion in America (Meridian
Press), the paperback featuring a multi-author, many-points-of-view approach
at its very best. It is expensive vis-A-vis the four pamphlets of the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions which combine balanced, fresh presen-
tations with the unbeatable allure of free copies. This is not to say that the
essays in the book under review are inferior to those in other publications;
they are not. The trouble is that the editors stand their case on one foot only.
With such subjective presentation of true problems, the impact of the materials
is lessened and "parts" fail to add to an objective "whole." It is this error in
judgment that at times makes one feel that we are sadly impaled on a steer's
horns of a dilemma with lots of bull in between.
EPHrRAIM MARGOLINt
THE PROMISED LAND OF SCIENCE
TowARD A REASONABLE SOCIETY: THE VALUES OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZA-
TION. By C. E. Ayres.' Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. 301.
$4.75.
APATHY and lack of purpose deeply trouble mid-century Americans. Life
constantly gets "better," but seemingly ever less satisfying. Today's youth,
despairing of finding meaningful careers, talk of seeking in marriage, in leisure
activities, and in their personal lives a sense of purpose which society does not
provide. In the glittering world that science has built, they have somehow lost
the way.
In Toward A Reasonable Society, C. E. Ayres attempts to set us on the path
once more. Mr. Ayres, a distinguished economist, contends that values and
purpose can indeed be found in an industrial-technological civilization, and
that values so derived are far more meaningful than the much mourned lost
faiths of prior ages. His book provides an important opportunity to assess the
promise of the scientific way of life.
True values, Mr. Ayres begins, derive from (and only from) the "life
process of mankind." In the activity of knowing-and-doing we learn what is
best for us, whether the question is which mushrooms can be eaten, or what
kind of government we need for the next fifty years. Values are operational
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